Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and Back Again

As reported yesterday on Mises.org, there were some very encouraging statements in Mervyn King’s Monday speech to the Buttonwood Gathering in New York. King noted that “Of all the many ways of organising banking, the worst is the one we have today”. After considering various possible reforms, he moved on to some that were “more radical” (my emphasis):

One simple solution, advocated by my colleague David Miles, would be to move to very much higher levels of capital requirements – several orders of magnitude higher. A related proposal is to ensure there are large amounts of contingent capital in a bank’s liability structure. Much more loss- absorbing capital – actual or contingent – can substantially reduce the size of costs that might be borne outside of a financial firm. But unless complete, capital requirements will never be able to guarantee that costs will not spill over elsewhere. This leads to the limiting case of proposals such as Professor Kotlikoff’s idea to introduce what he calls “limited purpose banking” (Kotlikoff, 2010). That would ensure that each pool of investments made by a bank is turned into a mutual fund with no maturity mismatch. There is no possibility of alchemy. It is an idea worthy of further study. Another avenue of reform is some form of functional separation. The Volcker Rule is one example. Another, more fundamental, example would be to divorce the payment system from risky lending activity – that is to prevent fractional reserve banking (for example, as proposed by Fisher, 1936, Friedman, 1960, Tobin, 1987 and more recently by Kay, 2009). In essence these proposals recognise that if banks undertake risky activities then it is highly dangerous to allow such “gambling” to take place on the same balance sheet as is used to support the payments system, and other crucial parts of the financial infrastructure. And eliminating fractional reserve banking explicitly recognises that the pretence that risk-free deposits can be supported by risky assets is alchemy. If there is a need for genuinely safe deposits the only way they can be provided, while ensuring costs and benefits are fully aligned, is to insist such deposits do not coexist with risky assets.

On regulation, King notes

We certainly cannot rely on being able to expand the scope of regulation without limit to prevent the migration of maturity mismatch. Regulators will never be able to keep up with the pace and scale of financial innovation. Nor should we want to restrict innovation. But it should be undertaken by investors using their own money not by intermediaries who also provide crucial services to the economy, allowing them to reap an implicit public subsidy.

He concludes

There is no simple answer to the too important to fail nature of banks. Maturity transformation brings economic benefits but it creates real economic costs. The problem is that the costs do not fall on those who enjoy the benefits. The damaging externalities created by excessive maturity transformation and risk-taking must be internalised. A market economy has proved to be the most reliable means for a society to expand its standard of living. But ever since the Industrial Revolution we have not cracked the problem of how to ensure a more stable banking system. We know that there will always be sharp and unpredictable movements in expectations, sentiment and hence valuations of financial assets. They represent our best guess as to what the future holds, and views about the future can change radically and unpredictably. It is a phenomenon that we must learn to live with. But changes in expectations can create havoc with the banking system because it relies so heavily on transforming short-term debt into long-term risky assets. For a society to base its financial system on alchemy is a poor advertisement for its rationality. Change is, I believe, inevitable. The question is only whether we can think our way through to a better outcome before the next generation is damaged by a future and bigger crisis. This crisis has already left a legacy of debt to the next generation. We must not leave them the legacy of a fragile banking system too.

Related articles:

The Staggering Economic Errors Behind The Policy of Quantitative Easing

In September of last year, I placed this article up on our web site detailing the theoretical errors behind the policy of quantitative easing. Clearly, as the MPC has now been given the green light by our chancellor, we expect this currency debasement to be starting soon. All it will “achieve” is a wealth transfer from those lucky enough to get the newly minted money, from those not luckily enough. I aimed to expose the faulty crank-economics that lies behind such thought processes last year and did not think a Tory government would be so foolish to let this happen under their watch, especially as they condemned it under a Labour government. Sadly, articles like this one need to be reproduced so that a new set of readers can hopefully have influence on the present administration. The mainstream economists hold that the volume of money in circulation, times its velocity is equal to the prices of all goods and services added up. This is the famous Theory of Exchange,MV=PT, or the mechanistic Quantity Theory of Money, where:

  • M is the stock of money,
  • V is the velocity of circulation: the number of times the monetary unit changes hands in a certain time period,
  • P is the general price level,
  • and T is the “aggregate” of all quantities of goods and services exchanged in the period.

It is held by the overwhelming majority of all economists, that if the velocity of money falls, the price level will fall and thus it is the duty of government, the monopoly issuer of money, the chief Central Planner of the Money Supply, to create more money to keep the price level where it is and thus preserve the existing spending habits of the nation.

Error One — the stock of money

It is held that if you can count the monetary units in the economy and their velocity, you can say what the price level is. As people find it very difficult to count the money in an economy, they cannot see the statistical relationship showing up mechanistically in the price level as expected: the authorities do not have a measure of the money supply which correlates to economic activity. Working from a sound theoretical basis, I and my colleague Anthony Evans can show you how to count money exactly and how that measure of the money stock correlates to economic activity: UKMoneyStocks[1] Note that changes in the mainstream measures — M0 and M4 — are quite different to changes in our measure — MA. However, it is MA which shows the best correlation to economic activity and not the measures used by the Bank of England and HM Treasury: MAvsGDP[1] MAvsRetail[1] The monetary authorities do not have an adequate measure of the money supply.

Error Two — the velocity of circulation

Velocity is defined as the average number of times during a period that a monetary unit (I will call this MU) is exchanged for a good or service. It is said that a 5% increase in money does not necessarily show itself up with a 5% increase in the price level. It is argued that this is because the velocity of money changes. The trick is to measure by how much the velocity has declined and then create new money — cross your fingers, pray to the Good Lord, do a rain dance around a fire, and hope that the new money will be spent — to fill in this gap left by the fall in velocity. When you buy a house, we do not say it “circulates”: money is exchanged against real bricks and mortar. The printer who sold me books would have had to sell printed things (i.e. real goods) and saved (forgone consumption) for the future purchase (act of consumption) of the house.  Imagine selling your house backwards and forwards between say you and your wife 10 times: the mainstream would argue that the velocity of circulation had risen! Yes as daft as it sounds, this is the present state of economics. Thus, if the velocity has gone up by a factor of 10, the price level has increased by the same factor. Here is the suggested rub: therefore, when the velocity of circulation falls, if you increase the money supply by the same factor that the velocity of circulation has fallen by, the price level will stay the same. Note, as explained above and in detail here, the mainstream do not actually know what money is. Well, let us be clear: it is the final good for which (all) other goods exchange. All of us who are productive make things for sale or sell services, even if it is only our own labour. We sell goods and services which we produce or offer for other goods and services we need. The most marketable of all commodities, money, is accepted by you and other citizens and facilitates exchange of your goods and services for other goods and services. Note that, at all times, money facilitates the exchange of real goods for other real goods. Party one and a counterparty exchanging or “selling” the house between one another 10 times causing an “increase in velocity” and thus an increase in the price level as an idea is utter garbage. If one party had sold real goods and saved in anticipation of buying the house — real bricks and mortar via the medium of money — this would facilitate a transaction of something (the party’s saved real goods) for something (the counterparty’s real house). Printing money to make sure the price level stays stable to facilitate the “circulating” house in the first example will facilitate a transfer of nothing (the paper) for something (the house). This is commonly called counterfeiting. This may be another helpful example of why velocity is utterly meaningless. Consider a dinner party: Guest A has a £1. He lends it to Guest B at dinner, who lends it to Guest C who lends it to Guest D. If Guest D pays it back to Guest C, who pays it back to Guest B pays Guest A, the £1 is said to have done £4’s worth of work. The bookkeeping of this transaction shows that £1 was lent out 4 times and they all cancel each other out! Just to be clear, £1 has done £1’s work and not £4’s work. No real wealth or value is created. The velocity of circulation makes no economic sense.

Error Three — the general price level

Since the monetary authorities have no means to sum the price and quantity of every individual transaction, they must work instead with the “general price level”, ignoring the vital role of changes in relative prices. As early as 1912, Ludwig von Mises demonstrated that new money must change the structure of relative prices. As anyone who has lived through the past year could tell you, new money is not distributed equally to everyone in the economy. It is injected over time and in specific locations: new money redistributes income to those who receive it first.  This redistribution of income not only alters people’s subjective perception of value, it also alters their weight in the marketplace. These factors can only lead to changes in the structure of relative prices. Mainstream economists believe that “money is neutral in the long run”. They do not have a theory of the capital structure of production which can account for the effects of time and relative prices. They believe increases in the money supply affect all sectors uniformly and proportionately. This is manifestly untrue: look at changes in the Bank of England’s balance sheet and your bank statement. Hayek wrote that his chief objection to this theory was that it paid attention only to the general price level and not to the structure of relative prices. He indicated that, in consequence, it disregarded the most harmful effects of increasing the money supply: the misdirection of resources and specifically unemployment. Furthermore, this wilful ignorance of relative prices explains the mainstream’s lack of an adequate theory of business cycles, something Hayek provided. The general price level aggregates away a vital factor: the relative structure of prices.

Error Four — the aggregate quantities of goods and services sold

Since the sum of price times quantity for every individual transaction is not available, the authorities must use the “aggregate quantity of goods and services sold”. This is nonsense: the quantities to be added together are incompatible. It makes no sense to add a kilogram of potatoes to a kilogram of copper to a litre of petrol to a day’s software consultancy to a 30-second television advert. The aggregate quantity of goods and services sold is an impossible sum.

Error Five — the equation is no more than a tautology

Consider this, if I  buy 10 copies of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations from a printing company for 7 monetary units (or MU), an exchange has been made: I gave up 7 MU’s to the printer, and the printer transferred 10 sets of printed works to me. The error that the mainstream make is that “10 sets of printed works have been regarded as equal to 7 MU, and this fact may be expressed thus: 7 MU  = 10 printed works multiplied by 0.7 MU per set of printed works.”  But equality is not self-evident. There is never any equality of values on the part of the two participants in exchange. The assumption that an exchange presumes some sort of equality has been a delusion of economic theory for many centuries. We only exchange if each party thinks he is getting something of greater value from the other party than he has already.  If there was equality in value, no exchange would happen! Value is subjective and utility is marginal: each party values the other’s goods or services more highly than their own. Thus, while the mainstream believe that there is a causal link between the “money side” of the equation and the “value of goods and services side”, it is just a tautology from which no economic knowledge can be gained.  All we are saying, if the Quantity Theory holds, is that “7 MU’s = 10 sets of printed works X 0.7 MU’s per set of printed works”: in other words, “7 MU = 7 MU”. Thus what is paid is what is received. This is like announcing to the world that you have discovered the fabulous fact that 2=2. The mechanistic Quantity Theory of Money is not a causal relation but a tautology.

Conclusion

The mechanistic Quantity Theory only provides us with a tautology and every term of “MV = PT” is seriously flawed. Public policy should not rest on the foundation of this bad science. If the money supply contracts as it has done so spectacularly since late 2008 (see the chart above), you will have less goods and services supporting less economic activity. This for sure is bad. We now have less money and less exchanging of real goods and services for other real goods and services. The only way to get more goods and services offered for exchange is if entrepreneurs get hold of their factors of production — land, labour and capital — and reorganise them to meet the new demands of the consumers in a more efficient way than before. The only thing that the government can do is to make sure it provides as little regulatory burden as possible and the lightest tax regime that it can run in order  to allow entrepreneurs to facilitate this correction. Certainly in my business of the supply of fish and meat to the food service sector —www.directseafoods.co.uk — I have never witnessed such an abrupt change in consumption patterns as people have traded down from more expensive species and cuts to less expensive ones. Thus I have to reorganise my offer to my customers and potential customers. No amount of fiddling about with the level of newly minted money in the economy will help this reorganisation of my factors of production: they need to be retuned to the new needs and desires of my customers. Quantitative easing, as I have said before, is firmly based on a belief in the so called “internal truths” held in the Quantity Theory of Money. I hope any reader can see that this belief is based on very faulty logic.  Bad logic gives us bad policy. A policy of QE says that because the velocity of circulation has fallen, we can print newly minted money, out of thin air, at the touch of a computer key, and create more demand for the exchange of goods and services. Money has been historically rooted in gold and silver because these cannot “vanish” overnight as we are seeing under our present state monopoly of money — fiat money, money by decree, i.e. bits of paper we are forced to use as legal tender. Remember, since 1971 when Nixon broke the gold link, money is just bits of paper, notwithstanding a promise to pay the bearer on demand. In the near future, this will no doubt remain the case. Indeed, anyone who dares to mention that the final good, for which all goods exchange, should be a real good that is scarce (hard to manipulate it, hard to destroy it) unlike paper and electronic journal entries (easy to manipulate, easy to destroy) is considered a lunatic! On a point of history, it is worthwhile remembering that, as we have mentioned here, the 1844 Peel Act did remove the banks’ practice of issuing promissory notes (paper money) over and above their reserves of gold (the most marketable commodity i.e. money) as this was causing bank runs, “panic”, boom and bust. They did not resolve the issues of demand deposits to be drawn by cheque. Both features allow banks to issue new money — i.e. certificates that have no prior production of useful economic activity such as our printer printing books or my selling of meat and fish — while retaining real money — claims to the printing of books and selling of my meat and fish — only to a percentage of the deposited money, i.e. the Reserve Requirement of the bank. In the UK, there is no Reserve Requirement anymore as far as I am aware, hence banks going for massive levels of leverage. It is no surprise that the house of cards has fallen down. Our proposal for a 100% reserve requirement is offered for discussion as the only sure-fire way of delivering lasting stability.  Listening to economists talking about the “velocity of circulation” falling and thus suggesting that we should conduct large scale Quantitative Easing to hold the price level is not economics, but the policy of the Witch Doctor and the Mystic. It is staggering that so much garbage, posing as sound knowledge, hinges on these grave errors.

Further reading

FT: Osborne Go-Ahead For Bank Boost

On the front page of the Financial Times of Saturday the 9th of Oct 2010, under the title “Osborne go-ahead for Bank boost”, we read the following;

Asked whether he would back a second round of quantitative easing, known as QE2, he said he would want to follow the practice of Alistair Darling, the former chancellor who always gave a green light for the MPC to act. “If the MPC ask – I have said I regard the MPC as independent – if it makes a judgment, I would want to follow that judgment and continue with the procedures of my predecessor in dealing with those requests,” the chancellor said.

[ The report appeared online as “Chancellor backs Bank of England action” ] Recently I responded to comments by noted journalist and uber-money-printing economist Tim Congdon, who supports QE2:

I would love to hear from AEP, or from Prof Congdon, exactly how creating money is supposed to create wealth. If the Central Banks of the world buy private sector bank debt, they create new demand-deposit money that the private sector banking system can then lend. So more money units chase the same goods and services? Where is the new wealth? Many people associate rising money supply measures with rising GDP and increased prosperity. Mistaking correlation for causation, they view an increasing money supply as the source of prosperity. This puts the cart before the horse. Wealth is only created when entrepreneurs make better goods and services, satisfying more of the needs of consumers, in better and more convenient and cheaper ways, via more capitalistic and hence more efficient methods of production. Both the capital investment and the subsequent purchase of the new goods and services should be supported by real savings (forgone consumption). If such genuine wealth creation occurs, it will prompt banks to increase lending, and under our current system of fractional reserve banking this will necessarily entail an expansion of the money supply. This expansion is the result, not the cause, of wealth creation. Artificially increasing the supply of money will not create wealth, any more than injecting mercury into your thermometer will cause a rise in temperature.

Halligan: QE Now Seen As An Aggressive Depreciation Tool

Another superb article from Liam Halligan:

While the US has doubled its monetary base over the last 18 months, the UK’s base money supply has tripled. That’s right – UK base money is now three times bigger as a percentage of GDP than it was at the start of 2009. Given all that money-printing – sorry, QE – the danger is that inflation expectations take hold, and price pressures spin out of control. For now, a lot of the UK’s QE money remains “inert”, and therefore not yet inflationary, seeing as the banking sector has so far refused to lend it on to firms and households – one reason the UK economy remains so weak. That will continue to be the case, in my view, until the banks have black-mailed the British government into following America’s “lead”, and expanded QE to include the purchase of toxic corporate “assets”  as well as government bonds. Eventually, though – and it may not take long – the huge expansion of the UK’s base money supply will cause broader monetary aggregates to balloon as well, even if credit creation multiples remain relatively subdued. The QE money is out there and is almost impossible to withdraw. Once that money gets into circulation, and is leant against many times over, the UK could face “stagflation” – when high and rising inflation combines with an economic slump.

I recommend the whole article.

Why Do We Have to Argue the Case for Free Trade?

I gave the following presentation at a fringe event during the Conservative conference in Birmingham.

Human Co-operation and the Universal Division of Labour

Adam Smith showed us, and it is not disputed internally within the nation, that specialisation in tasks has led to the explosion of the population and material prosperity.  One person the farmer, one the hunter, one the gatherer, one the home maker, etc., with the specialisation always geared to who is best at doing the task. This is accepted by all rational people. Ricardo showed us that what applies to the individuals in the nation should also apply to the free trade between the nations of the world.  It is always advantageous for each nation to concentrate all its efforts to produce things it is best at, even if it could produce some other lesser goods better than the next best producer. So why does this idea meet such resistance? Why do we allow crony capitalists and other vested interests to get a privileged, protected position — such as the European Union farmers when they argue for the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) — that allows them to push up the prices of their goods and services at the expense of you and me, the consumer?

The Irrefutable Case for Free Trade

David Beckham is a super star football player, who also learned the skills of his father the gas fitter. His father, Beckham senior is a gas fitter who wanted to be a superstar football player Let’s say that David can hire a gas fitter for £20 per hour. With a little practice, he could be twice as efficient as his father. We will imagine that he could market his own gas fitting services for £40 per hour. By playing football, we will suppose that Beckham  can earn £10,000 per hour. Meanwhile, his father the gas fitter couldn’t make more than £1 an hour playing football. Beckham Jnr has a 2-to-1 advantage as a gas fitter, but a 10,000-to-1 advantage football star. If he divides his time equally between gas fitting his own house and playing football, his total output for the week can be valued at: 10 hours gas fitting  x £40 per hour = £400 10 hours football x £10,000 per hour = £100,000 Total output: £100,400 If David’s father divides his time the same way we could value his production as follows: 10 hours gas fitting  x £20 per hour = £200 10 hours football x £1 per hour = £10 Total output: £210 Between them, David and father have produced £100,610 worth of output.

The Law of Association (Mises) or the Law of Comparative Advantage (Ricardo)

Now let’s examine the situation if, as we expect, David hires his father. David’s production can now be valued at: 20 hours football x £10,000 per hour = £200,000 Total output: £200,000 And his father’s at: 20 hours gas fitting x £20 per hour = £400 Total output: £400 Their total output has risen to £200,400.

The Greatest Protectionist Block in European History: The European Union

With this case proven, our politicians should use the irrefutable law of association to call for the dismantling of fortress Europe as it price gouges its hapless taxpayers. The Taxpayers Alliance report “Food for Thought” by Dr Lee Rotherham shows us that the EU protectionist food policies costs the UK £10.3 bn per year or £400 of net disposable income per household. CAP is one aspect of the protectionism sponsored by the EU depriving us of a higher living standard; the real cost of all their interventions is many thousands of pounds per year for the EU taxpayer.

Cobden and Peel

For those interested in free trade, one of Cobden’s finest orations was delivered in the House of Commons on March 13, 1845, and described by John Morley as “probably the most powerful speech he ever made:

Men on the Tory benches whispered to one another, “Peel must answer this.” But Peel crushed in his hand the notes he had made and remarked, “Those may answer him who can.”

The Corn Laws were abolished by persuasive, clear, rational and logical argument. I hope some of the politicians here today will be able to do the same with the protectionist EU, and have that abolished.

Limited Purpose Banking?

In April, I reviewed Jimmy Stewart is Dead by Laurence Kotlikoff. Yesterday, Jerry O’Driscoll posted a review of his own:

Chapter 1 of the book is titled “It’s a Horrible Mess,” and in it Laurence Kotlikoff, a professor of economics at Boston University, reminds the reader of the breadth, depth, and horror of the global financial crisis. It is a cure for the dispassionate observer of events, an indictment that would send all but those with ice water in their veins to sign up for the Tea Party Express. The book is a particularly well-written account of the crisis that begins in housing finance, spreads throughout the financial system, and then throughout the real economy. The crisis hit in tsunami-like waves beginning in 2007 and continued into 2009. In Kotlikoff’s words, “We thought we had well-functioning banking and insurance companies with competent directors, world-class managers, responsible regulators, and incorruptible rating companies. But overnight, we it learned it was a sham.”

O’Driscoll thinks the Achilles heel of Kotlikoff’s proposals is their reliance on a financial regulator:

Kotlikoff excels at detailing the failings of the existing regulatory structure, but does not explain why his proposed system would work any better. If the regulators at the FFA face the same incentives as do those at the SEC (and the rest of Washington’s alphabet soup panoply of regulators), then we should expect the same outcome. Government regulation, no matter the industry, typically fails for two reasons. First, there is the Hayekian knowledge problem. The information needed for effective regulation is dispersed across firms, the industry, and even the economy. There is no effective means for marshaling and centralizing the information within the agency. Second, regulators are routinely captured by the industry they regulate. Through frequent interaction with members of the industry, regulators come to identify with the industry’s interests over the public’s. The revolving door between industry and government exacerbates that problem.

Even so, he concludes:

There is a great deal to recommend this book. First, there is Kotlikoff’s recounting of the crisis itself. Second, there is sense of the manifest injustice of a system in which bad actors get to gamble with other people’s money. Third, there is the challenge to do something radical to reform a system that is radically dysfunctional.

Read the whole review.